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COMMENT
COMBATING SOFTWARE PIRACY:
A STATUTORY PROPOSAL TO
STRENGHTEN SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT
The restriction is confined to the specific form, to the collocation devised,
• . . but . . . if it was to be protected at all, that collocation would be
protected according to what was its essence. One would expect the pro-
tection to be coextensive not only with the invention, . . . but with the
possibility of reproducing the result which gives to the invention its meaning
and worth.,
INTRODUCTION
Our legal system has not kept pace with the needs of the computer software
industry.2 There has been no adequate statutory or common law response to
the need for legal protection of software innovations.3 The absence of an
1. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
2. K. PAVITT, THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS IN TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 22 (1971); see
also J. WALLACE, UNDERSTANDING SOFTWARE LAW 3 (1984) ("the law typically takes five to
twenty years to catch up to new technological developments"); Law Plays Catch-Up in Computer
Rush, Chi. Tribune, Feb. 28, 1985, § 3, at 9, col. 5 (quoting several computer law experts and
attorneys affiliated with the 950-member Computer Law Association). The Chicago Tribune
article emphasizes the response of the legal profession in meeting the challenges of new
technology: "Nationwide, law firms and law schools are recognizing that the spread of computers
through the business world is creating hundreds of novel legal situations that demand the
attention of lawyers with experience in computer-related matters." Id. See also Blodgett, Bar
Committees Jump Into Computer Law, 10 B. LEADER 28 (1985) (detailing the number of new
computer law committees and subcommittees formed by state and local bar associations).
John Naisbitt, author of the best-seller MEGATRENDS, argues that the legal profession will
be called on to resolve disputes and quarrels in a society of advanced information technology.
He notes that computers present novel questions for our legal system: "We are only now
beginning to sense the complications for a society inundated with computerized electronic
wizardry." Naisbitt, Megatrends For Lawyers and Clients, A.B.A. J., June 1984, at 45-46.
This theme is echoed in a recent issue of the A.B.A. Section on Litigation's publication,
Litigation News, which noted the relationship between law and intellectual property in a service-
based economy: "For, as our society becomes more service-oriented, so the need to protect the
products of the mind becomes increasingly significant to our economy." West, Intellectual
Property Spawns Litigation Explosion, LITIGATION NEWS, Spring 1985, at 1.
3. One commentator noted the clouded state of computer law:
In spite of this heightened focus on software protection, intellectual property law
protecting computer programs is a topic characterized by many unanswered ques-
tions .... The legal structure surrounding software has not, however, kept pace
with the technological changes occurring within the computer industry. Although
there is voluminous material on the legal protection of software, no definitive legal
principles have emerged concerning the procedures used to protect software.
J. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 21 (1983).
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effective legal response has left the software industry vulnerable to pirating, 4
thus restricting the development of new programs. The high demand for
software, combined with the ease of piracy, stimulates a high volume of
software theft.' According to one estimate, there are as many as twenty
unauthorized copies of software programs for every authorized copy.6 Piracy
cuts deeply into software revenues7 and therefore discourages investment in
the software industry.'
4. This article adopts the general practice of using the term "pirate" to refer to individuals
who steal a work by either direct or indirect copying in violation of the original owner's rights.
The piracy problem takes several forms. Competing software developers appropriate the
creative product of others and create rival programs. "Private" pirates make copies of software
programs and sell ("bootleg") or exchange the unauthorized copies. Finally, software can be
pirated when a purchaser "leases" the program for a fraction of its fair cost to third parties
who copy the program. For a discussion of piracy issues, see E. KEET, PREVENTING PIACY:
BUSINESS GUIDE TO SOFTWARE PROTECTION (1985); F. NEITZ, SOFTWARE LAW PRIMER (1984);
Tangorra, The Fight Against Software Piracy, Publishers Weekly, Aug. 24, 1984, at 34; Note,
Software Piracy and the Personal Computer: Is the 1980 Software Copyright Act Effective? 4
COMPUTER L.J. 171, 174-75 (1983); Software Rentals: Piracy is the Hot New Issue, Bus. WK.
Aug. I, 1983, at 90-91 (discussing software value and financial threat of illegal copying through
rentals); Crackdown On Computer Capers, TIME, Feb. 8, 1982, at 60-61.
5. Goldschmitt, Thou Shalt Not Dupe, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 28, 1985, at 51. The author
cites the work of the Association of Data Processing Service Organizations (ADAPSO), an
organization that represents more than 750 corporate members and provides a wide spectrum
of computer services. ADAPSO has begun a major educational campaign to confront the
software theft problem. ADAPSO will circulate more than 60,000 educational brochures to end
users, data processing professionals, corporate legal counsel, educational institutions, and U.S.
corporate presidents, urging them to adopt a software protection policy statement. See Note,
supra note 4, at 172 ("the relatively low risk of penalty [has] created a powerful incentive to
steal other people's work . . . .[Tihere are few practical or legal barriers inhibiting or preventing
a 'pirate' from copying a computer program."); see also MacGrady, Protection of Computer
Software-An Update and Practical Synthesis, 20 Hous. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (1983) (most
discussion in this area has been academic, "leaving no practical advice for the software owner");
Ortner, Current Trends in Software Protection-A Litigation Perspective, 25 JURIMETRICS J.
319 (1985).
6. Sterne & Saidman, Copying Mass-Marketed Software, BYTE, Feb. 1985, at 387. This
article, written by computer law practitioners, presents an overview of recent lawsuits filed by
Lotus, Inc. for copyright infringement against alleged pirates. A survey conducted by Future
Computing, Inc., published on January 17, 1985, characterizes Sterne & Saidman's estimate as
"conservative." Future Computing "believes that there is one pirated copy of business software
in use for every copy authorized by the publisher." Goldschmitt, supra note 5, at 51 (citing
the Future Computing survey). Some software market researchers believe that "as many as nine
bootleg copies are in use for each legitimate disk." Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1986, § 2, at 17, col.
3.
7. Goldschmitt, supra note 5, at 52. See also Politics & Policy: Pirates at Bay, FORTUNE,
Jan. 21, 1985, at 83, 84 (four billion dollars estimated lost to piracy); Wall. St. J., supra note
6 (software producers outraged "because they believe that pirates are costing them millions
of dollars in lost revenues).
8. NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHT WORKS, FINAL REPORT I1
(1979) [hereinafter cited as CONTUJ. Potential returns on a good programming system are
promising. See Software Rentals: Piracy is the Hot New Issue, supra note 4, at 90. However,
the process requires a significant investment of human intellectual skills. See, e.g., M. BRAUN-
STEIN, ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AS APPLIED TO COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND DATA BASES
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This Comment discusses alternative remedies for computer piracy. The
first section presents a survey of computer technology, emphasizing the
uniqueness of software as intellectual property. The second section sets out
the principles of patent and trade secret protection, two commonly suggested
legal remedies for piracy, and concludes that these protections are inadequate
for mass marketed software. The third section analyzes the nature of copy-
right protection, with an emphasis on the current uncertainties in the area
of software protection. This Comment concludes by proposing reforms in
copyright law that place software developers on an equal footing with other
copyright owners. This proposal also stands the best chance of stemming
computer piracy.
I. COMPUTER HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY
Software sales are becoming an important part of the American economy.
The personal computer market has grown since its origin in the mid-1970's
into a seventeen billion dollar industry, 9 with expectations of vast future
growth.10 Consumer demand for software has also expanded at a remarkable
11 (1981), reprinted in 4 Copyright, Congress, and Technology: The Public Record I (N. Henry
ed. 1980) (software development characterized by heavy costs incurred in the development
stage). One commentator notes that the long process of creating software is more like engineering
than art: a process of problem or project definition, followed by designing the product (the
program), creating a prototype (writing the source code), testing the product (debugging), and
ultimately realizing a commercially marketable product. Davidson, Protecting Computer Soft-
ware: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 339, 342 (1983). It has been estimated
that development costs for each program average between $50,000 and $200,000. J. GEMIGNANI,
LAW AND THE COMPUTER 81 (1981).
Like any other business decision, the decision to develop a computer program depends
upon the potential return on the investment. J. MILLER, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS:
THEORY, ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 304 (1978). Developers must also take into consideration the
absence of adequate legal protection afforded software. Comment, Copyright Protection of
Systems Control Software Stored in Read Only Memory Chips: Into the World of Gulliver's
Travels, 33 BUFFALO L. REv. 193, 195 (1984) (availability and extent of protection "will
substantially affect the national computer market, including both large companies and individual
consumers"). Indeed, judicial rulings and legislative enactments regarding the extent of protec-
tion may govern the long-term price, availability, quality, and form of software for both
business and individual users. See also D. BROOKS, PROTECTING, ACQUIRING AND MARKETING
COMPUTER SOFTWARE FOR THE MASS MARKET 18-19 (1982) (software houses and vendors of
independently created software seek assurances of a means of recovering and profiting from
their investment).
9. Perspectives on the 1984 U.S. Personal Computer Market, OFFICE VIEWS, Dec. 1984,
at 2. See also 1984 in Review, FUTURE VIEWS, Jan. 1985, at 2-4 (a newsletter of Future
Computing Incorporated, a Dallas-based research company catering strictly to the computer
industry) (annual expenditures on U.S. personal computer market has tripled since 1981); To
Each His Own Computer, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 50 (between 1976, the first year
personal computers were sold, and 1981, an estimated $1.5 billion in computers were sold).
10. Although specific projections of growth in the computer industry vary, estimates range
from $53 billion in 1989, see FUTURE VIEWS, supra note 9, at 2, to $150 billion in 1994, see
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP., 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1985).
The popularity of the personal computer is due in part to its wide range of available uses.
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rate. In the past, hardware-related products accounted for most of the
computer industry's revenues." Today, software sales are leading the com-
puter industry;' 2 sales of software are expected to equal, and eventually
surpass, sales of hardware by the mid-1990's." 3 The software industry pro-
vides excellent opportunities for start-up companies because of the ease with
which an individual or group can successfully develop new products. 4 Com-
puter software developers now enjoy a broad-based and continuously ex-
panding market for their products."
To appreciate the significance of this new industry to the legal profession,
it is first necessary to understand what software is. Computer technology is
See Sci. AM., Sept. 1982 (documenting the role of computers in such areas as design, marketing,
and commerce). See also Machine of the Year, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 15 (describing achievements
of modern computer technology and many ways that computers improve our lives). The sharp
decline in the cost of computer systems, concurrent with an increase in their speed and power,
is another major factor in the rise in computer use: "The most startling change in computer
system technology has been the dramatic decrease of hardware cost by a factor of 2 every two
to three years since 1945." P. WEGNER, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
IN SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY 3 (1980). See also F. HAROLD, INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTERS 46
(1984) (trends of increasing speed and accuracy, and diminishing size and cost, make computers
useful for businesses and individuals).
II. FUTURE VIEWS, supra note 9, at 3.
12. See Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1985, at 6, col. I (one bright spot in presently stagnate
computer market is software sales).
13. FUTURE VIEWS, supra note 9, at 3.
14. R. LEVERING, M. KATZ, & M. MOSKOWITZ, THE COMPUTER ENTREPRENEURS (1984).
The authors describe and profile the phenomenal growth of the personal computer industry,
emphasizing the incredible opportunities which exist:
In the course of a few short years, the personal computer ushered in a Gold Rush
unlike any other in the history of American business. Companies were formed-
and fortunes created-with incredible speed. Apple Computer made the Fortune
500 roster in less than five years after its birth in a Silicon Valley garage. No
company had ever achieved that before. And while it took McDonalds 15 years to
get to the $1 billion sales mark, ComputerLand stores accomplished it in only 8.
Id. at 2.
Furthermore, new entrants into the software industry greatly exceed new entrants into the
hardware market. The software industry is characterized by low capital costs, and allows
smaller, more flexible developers to move quickly to fill a market need when a gap occurs. See
Dvorak, Formula for Software Success, INFOWORLD, Dec. 10, 1984, at 76. In addition to the
formation of new software companies by entrepeneurs, the financial markets have recently
placed high values on software. The ADAPSO/Broadview Index, an industry measure, an-
nounced that software mergers and acquisitions hit record highs in 1985, when over 200 software
companies either merged or were acquired, a figure up 42%'o over 1984. WALL ST. J., Jan. 23
1986, § 1, at I, col. 5 (concluding that the flurry of activity is a healthy sign on interest in the
software industry by outside companies).
15. Note, The Policy Implications of Granting Patent Protection to Computer Software:
An Economic Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 147, 148 (1984). See also R. BAKER, SCUTTLE THE
COMPUTER PIRATES 129-31 (1984) (mass-marketed microcomputer software sold in substantially
higher volume when both hardware and software were sold or "bundled" in same product
line).
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made up of two principal components: hardware 6 and software.' 7 Hardware
16. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. See also J. ADAMS & D. HADEN, COM-
PUTERS: APPRECIATION, APPLICATIONS, IMPLICATIONS 242 (1973); G. DAVIS, INTRODUCTION TO
ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS 5 (1973); J. SoMA, supra note 3, at 20 ("hardware" generally refers
to electrical machinery of computer); Maggs, Some Problems of Legal Protection of Programs
for Microcomputer Control Systems, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 453.
All modern computers have roots in the early works of mathematicians and inventors. The
algebra of logic by George Boole, the punched card by Herman Hollerith, and the calculator
built by George Aiken represent several important prior developments. Also of great historical
importance was the work of Charles Babbage in the early 1800's. Babbage's technological
description of an analytical engine, which would execute an arbitrary sequence of operations,
and had internal data storage, is remarkably close to the basic idea of modern computers.
The first machine to resemble modern computers was the Electronic Numerical Integrator
and Calculator (ENIAC). Used mainly for calculating tables, the ENIAC used electronic
components but had no internal memory. The first computer to store instructions internally in
digital form was the Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer (EDVAC). EDVAC was
unique because it used binary numbers for electronic arithmetic operations. The binary number
system contains only two digits, "0" and "1." A series of these digits are combined to instruct
the computer in an almost infinite variety of commands. The "0" represents a switch in open
or false position, and "I" represents a switch in the closed or true position. See J. SOMA,
supra note 3, at 23.
As hardware developed, the computer industry labelled the various stages of advancement.
Computers built'during the 1950's used vacuum tubes and were identified as first generation
computers. Second generation computers were characterized by the use of transistors in place
of vacuum tubes. The transistor required less power, was smaller and less expensive, generated
very little heat, and generally made the computer more reliable. Third generation computers
were identified by integrated circuits, their orientation to data communication, and their ability
to handle multiple operations simultaneously. J. SOMA, supra note 3, at 23.
Fourth generation computers are termed "very large-scale integrated" computers (VLSI),
or supercomputer systems. All fourth generation computers are composed of a central processor,
a memory, an arithmetic unit, and input-output devices. We are currently at the intersection
between the third and fourth generations of computers. E. FEIGENBAUM & P. MCCORDUCK,
THE FIFTH GENERATION, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND JAPAN'S COMPUTER CHALLENGE TO THE
WORLD 15 (1984); G. DAVIS, supra, at 9.
17. Since software refers to the instruction sequence that is necessary to bring about a
certain result, the term "software" is used synonomously with "computer program." Congress
adopted such a definition of software in an amendment to the Copyright Act: "A 'computer
program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer
in order to bring about a certain result." Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015, 3028 (1980) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117).
The first software systems were packages of machine language subroutines that made
programming more convenient by providing a source of "canned" programs for input-output
and for common numerical calculations. Machine language, the first and most rudimentary
programming language, consisted of a combination of binary digits. Data and instructions were
represented in binary form, yet the specific combinations were unique because every computer
had its own machine language that could not be transferred to another type of computer.
Coding programs in machine language was a laborious and expensive process because of the
detail required. F. HAROLD, supra note 10, at 224.
Subsequent software developers concentrated on developing better programming languages.
Assember language, which used one assember instruction to specify one machine operation in
object code, was developed for many early computers. Assember languages were efficient in
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is the physical or machine aspect of the computer system. There are four
functional components of computer hardware: input,' 8 control and logic,' 9
memory, 0 and output.2 These physical components combine to perform a
countless variety of functions. The hardware is the framework within which
various functions of the computer take place.22 To function, however, the
terms of storage space and processing time, yet still required a high level of skill to program
effectively. J. SOMA, supra note 3, at 42. In the late 1950's, the development of algorithmic
programming language, which used specific procedure-oriented mnemonic codes, increased
rapidly. Important languages that developed during this period include FORTRAN (1958),
ALGOL (1959), and COBOL (1960). F. HAROLD, supra note 10, at 224-25.
As computer technology advanced and became more sophisticated, software played an
increasingly important role in expanding the use and application of the computer. The current
trend is toward software costs becoming a major percentage of total system costs. Hence,
software becomes more important to the industry and society as a whole. FuTURE VIEWs, supra
note 9, at 3.
18. See F. HAROLD, supra note 10, at 83-93. Input hardware usually consists of key punches,
key-to-tape or key-to-disk, character recognition, and on-line data collection devices such as
terminals and data processing equipment. Input has traditionally been a bottleneck in computer
systems, causing a major portion of both time and error problems.
19. See F. HAROLD, supra note 10, at 104-06. The control and logic components make up
what is generally called the central processing unit (CPU). The control and logic functions,
along with the main memory, which is either directly attached to or located within the CPU,
perform most of the data manipulation. Processing raw data, to convert it to meaningful
information, may require arithmetic computations, logical operations, and movement of data
to appropriate locations. The CPU performs all of these operations.
20. See J. SOMA, supra note 3, at 29. Memory may exist in several forms: tape devices,
disk drives, or integrated circuitry. Typically, tape or disk drives are used to store machine
readable data that can be organized and processed in sequence. The computer communicates
the results of the data processing information to the user. Such feedback from the computer
to user is known as output.
21. See F. HAROLD, supra note 10, at 152-54. Output hardware is often integrated with
input hardware. The product of the CPU may be stored on disk or tape and simultaneously
routed to a line printer (hard copy), cathode ray tube (CRT), or video display terminal (VDT)
(soft copy) for review by the individual using the computer. Historically, the process of computer
output has been slow compared with the speed at which the CPU can process data. The reason
for both slow input and slow output is the mechanization of the equipment used during the
process.
22. J. SOMA, supra note 3, at 22. There are two types of hardware: analog computers and
digital computers. Analog computers represent information in continuous form. G. DAVIS,
supra note 16, at 6. An example of a representation of information in continuous form is a
thermometer. No matter where the mercury appears along the temperature scale, it represents
a definite value. The bead of mercury is able to represent an infinite set of values, regardless
of its position on the scale. Analog computers represent data by measuring physical or electrical
quantities on a graduated scale. The analog computer then converts the physical quantity into
a symbolic representation that is the measure of that quantity. Numeric results are obtained
indirectly, and thus analog computers are both more cumbersome and inaccurate, and are better
suited for controlling continuing processes, like oil refining or rubber synthesis. See F. HAROLD,
supra note 10, at 59-60.
Digital computers, on the other hand, represent information in discrete form. An example
of the representation of information in discrete form is an abacus. The beads in an abacus can
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hardware requires instructions. Software systems, 23 commonly referred to as
computer programs, are the sets of instructions that control the mechanical
hardware operations. The term "computer software" is difficult to define
in a legal sense.2 4 Lawyers' lack of understanding of fundamental software
concepts has led to confusion about the legal protection that should be
afforded to computer software. 25 An accurate understanding of software
technology is essential to an analysis of the legal protection software should
be given.
There are two competing perspectives on the nature of software. Software
is understood by some to be a simple set of instructions that operate a
computer system. 26 From this perspective, a computer system is limited by
only be in an up or down position. If the bead is anywhere in the middle of the bar it has no
value. Digital computers, using the more flexible discrete form binary notation system, may be
applied for a variety of specific purposes and are, therefore, widely used in business, science,
and personal applications. Today, digital computers comprise over 95% of computer systems.
See R. GEORGE, COMPUTERS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 17 (1970). In fact, most literature on
computers assumes that the discussion involves only digital computers. The reasons for the
dominance of digital computers include: 1) problems that can be solved on analog can also be
solved on digital computers, but the reverse, in general, is not true; and 2) an analog computer
requires an understanding of calculus, while a digital computer can be used and understood
without any special mathematical background. G. DAvIs, supra note 16, at 11-12. These factors
reflect the fact that digital computers are easier to use and to program.
23. See Pope & Pope, Protection of Proprietary Interests in Computer Software, 30 ALA.
L. REV. 527 (1979).
24. See Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 483,
484 (1981).
25. Caswell, The Classification of Software: A Logical and Rational Approach, 24 JURI-
METRICS J. 377, 380 (1984). In a cogent analysis of definitional issues involving software, one
commentator concluded:
Current legal treatment of software is inconsistent at best, and irrational at worst.
As each individual area of the law addresses the applicable software issues, the
concept of software is twisted and manipulated to fit into a current regulatory
framework that may be inadequate for the new technology. Concepts are further
contorted by the countervailing and contradictory incentives offered by the regu-
lations in different areas of the law. When the judicial system then becomes
embroiled in software issues, the inadequacies of lawyers and the courts in dealing
with computer software only further confuse the situation.
Id. at 395. Moreover, an article in a computer trade journal noted: "The inability to deal with
fundamental software concepts has been reflected in much legislation and in many court
decisions. The results have been inconsistent at best." Dakin & Higgins, Fingerprinting a
Program, DATAMATION, April 1982, at 133-34.
26. In the early years of computer science, the programming of a computer was closely tied
to the specific structure of the computer system and the functional task required. Most programs
were custom engineered for each application. See Caswell, supra note 25, at 381; J. SOMA,
supra note 3, at 21. The set of instructions or line-by-line commands are given in specific order,
where each line provides a separate command to the computer. The importance of the "set of
instructions" is shown in a common definition of a computer program: "a detailed set of
instructions telling the computer what types of input data it will receive, exactly what operations
to perform on it and in what order, and what type of output." M. HARRIS, INTRODUCTION TO
DATA PROCESSING: A SELF-TEACHING GUIDE 300 (1979).
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the hardware's physical capabilities and the instruction set provided by the
software. 27 Because computer performance is dictated by a set of programmed
instructions, 2 software is an integral component of the computer system
without any separate existence. This view of software, however, is outdated
because it is based on the operation of the large, clumsy analog computers
of the past. 29
The second view of software more accurately reflects current computer
technology. Under this perspective, software is a separate, interchangeable
embodiment of logic derived from a human designer's ideas.3 0 Until recently,
most software was custom-produced by only a few companies and was sold
under contracts that prohibited purchasers from copying the programs. While
some software is still custom designed for special applications, most software
sales today are made to the mass consumer market.' Under the modern
view, software is a valuable product because it operates independently of
any particular computer.12 It is produced apart from the hardware,33 marketed
separately from hardware systems, and created independently in many cases
by software houses.3 4 Most software is also multi-compatible or transport-
able,3" which expands the number of specific uses for computers. Hence,
27. See Caswell, supra note 25, at 381; Root, Protecting Computer Software in the '80s:
Practical Guidelines for Evolving Needs, 8 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 205, 209 (1981).
28. For example, the size of the memory limits the range of complex functions that the
computer can process. Memory is expressed as a measure of "bits" of machine-readable words.
The memory capacity is typically cited as a quantity of 1000 bits or "kilobytes." See T. BARTEE,
DIGITAL COMPUTER FUNDAMENTALS 48 (5th ed. 1981).
29. See supra note 22 (explaining difference between digital and analog computers).
30. See Rauzino, Conversations with an Intelligent Chaos, DATAMATION, May 1982, at 130-
136; see also Bing, New Technology and the Law: Likely Impact and Future Trends, COMPUTERS
& LAW, Feb. 1983, at 6 (mass-marketed software is an independent embodiment of structured
human logic).
31. See D. BROOKS & M. KEPUNGER, SOFTWARE PROTECTION 241 (1982); Comment, Copy-
right Protection of Computer Program Object Code. 96 HARV. L. REV. 1723 (1983); Johnson,
Copyright Protection for Computer Flow Logic and Algorithms, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 257 (1984).
32. See Caswell, supra note 25, at 382; see also Christo, The Law and DP: A Clash of
Egos, DATAMATION, Sept. 1982, at 265 (this view of software represents current technological
understanding and evidences current legal problems).
33. See Root, supra note 27, at 207: "[a] primary characteristic shared by all software is
that it is separable from the hardware, so that different software can be used on the same
machine to solve different problems."
34. See Bing, supra note 30, at 5 (legal constructs must change to reflect reality that software
has a separate marketability and creation thaft hardware).
35. Caswell, supra note 25, at 381 n.19:
Transportable software is software that can be used on a variety of machines or
operating systems with little or no modification. Thus, a transportable software
program in, for example, BASIC could be used on several of the many personal
or home computers, which support BASIC. The primary advantage to transporta-
bility is that one piece of software can become operational on many different
computers without any reprogramming or other transformation that might create
what could be viewed as a separate product. Since the software can run on any
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computer software is viewed as a separate physical embodiment of a struc-
tured logic derived from the human developers' thoughts, concepts, and
ideas.
A software product also represents the logic and ideas of its developer.
The computer performs tasks, directed by the program, which resemble the
routine logic occurring in the human mind.36 The computer's rapid use of
logical sequences expands and accelerates human thought processes.17 This
view of software technology is consistent with the developing technology of
artificial intelligence-the projected ability of computers to learn and think
without human participation.3"
The two competing views on the nature of computer software have pro-
duced confusion about the legal protection that software should be given.
If software is defined as a component of the computer, inseparable from
the hardware, then the software itself need not be legally protected. If
software is defined as an independent product, created and marketed sepa-
rately from the computer system, then a system of independent legal pro-
tection for software is warranted. Although software technology has progressed
so that software is now a valuable product in its own right, current legal
protection of software presumes the outdated view of the technology. The
legal protection for software based on the older view is anachronistic and
should be reformed. 39
computer, software and hardware should not be deemed to be a single unitary
product.
36. Gemignani, Computers and the Law-Pandora's Proverbial Box, 25 REs GESTAE 758,
762 (1982); Comment, The Nature and Taxability of Computer Software, 22 WASHBURN L.J.
103, 105 (1982).
37. Caswell, supra note 25, at 383. For a discussion of the symbolic nature of programming
in relation to legal protection, see J. LAUTSCH, AMERICAN STANDARD HANDBOOK OF SOFTWARE
LAW § 3 (1985).
38. Roberts, To Teach a Machine, TECH. REV., Jan. 1982, at 23, 24. Mr. Roberts argues
that current computers mimic the logical processes of the left side of the brain, and that future
developments need only to subsume the right side functions of association, inference, and
extrapolation. The article predicts that one day the computer may be the intellectual equal of
man. Another important future prediction of software technology is automated programming,
in which a computer writes programs by itself. See Lerner, Automating Programming, 182
I.E.E.E. SPECTRUM, Aug. 1982, at 28.
39. There are two broad categories of computer software: operating system programs and
applications programs. Operating systems programs internally control the routine electromag-
netic operations of the computer. C. SIPPL & R. SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK
423-24 (3d ed. 1980). Operating systems programs provide the "[pllans or instructions for
controlling input/output operations, remote data transmissions, and multiple users which can
be used and reused to control these operations." Application programs direct computer systems
to perform specific particularized tasks. Application programs are more important to computer
users because of their utilitarian function: to provide instructions that solve particular problems.
This Comment will focus on application programs, which are the most important commercial
software products.
40. One commentator has stated that .'Firmware' is a term of art in the computer industry,
and refers to micro-instructions permanently embodied in hardware elements." Mantle, Trade
Secret and Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 669 n.1 (1984).
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Finally, beyond traditional software there is a new programming technol-
ogy in the computer field called "firmware." 4 Firmware defies definition
as either software or hardware. Firmware is composed of integrated circuit
chips, which are solid units about the size of a fingernail that are often
made of silicon, into which active or passive components are integrated. 4
These chips may be integrated into the computer's circuit boards. 42 Firmware
can function like software in a computer. It is often used to store computer
instructions and information. A program can be embodied in permanent or
semi-permanent form in the integrated circuit chip.
There are several different types of firmware chips. A "Read Only Mem-
ory" (ROM) chip stores electronically coded, machine readable words. 43
These machine readable words are often a set of instructions which are
permanently encoded into the ROM chip and which can only be read, not
erased or rewritten. 44 A variation of the ROM is the Progammable Read
Only Memory chip (PROM), which can be used to permanently store desired
programs.4 5 An Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory chip (EPROM)
can be erased and rewritten upon. 46 Finally, chips may have Random Access
Memory (RAM), a function that allows an operator to read and operate
user programs in storage while the main program is in use.
47
II. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR PROTECTING SOFTWARE
Although this article focuses primarily on copyright protection of computer
programs, software developers have traditionally pursued two other forms
of intellectual property protection: patent and trade secret law. 48 This section
41. See Ross, Patentability of Computer Firmware, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 731, 736 (1977).
42. See G. DAVIS, supra note 16, at 28.
43. See M. KRUTrz, MICROPROCESSORS AND Locic DESIGN 5 (1980).
44. See T. BARTEE, supra note 28, at 336.
45. See F. HAROLD, supra note 10, at 39-40.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 390. The advent of RAM chips is a recent advance in data storage technology.
Because RAM chips are the only type of memory device that can approximate the speed of a
microprocessor chip, data input is much quicker with RAM chips than with disk drives or
optical disks.
48. Another avenue of protection for intellectual property is the common law concept of
misappropriation, which is a "safety net" equity theory that governs wrongful appropriation
of intellectual property. See, e.g., E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
PRIMER 3 (1982). Common law misappropriation remedies evolved in response to unfair trade
practices regarding traditional media. In practice, however, misappropriation was not applicable
to computer software litigation. In the only case which appears to address the issue, Videotronics,
Inc. v. Bend Elect., 26 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 636, at 196 (June 30,
1983), the plaintiff, a developer of a video game program, sought relief under both copyright
and state common law doctrines. The federal court, however, explicitly stated that "because
... the plaintiff's property interest in the computer program contained in its electronic video
device is covered under the Copyright Act, relief under the state common law doctrines of
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reviews the application of patent and trade secret law to mass-marketed
software and criticizes the use of these approaches as being inadequate to
protect modern software technology.
A. Patent Protection
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.""
Under this grant of authority, Congress enacted patent laws to protect an
inventor's monopoly over the profitable use of a salable device.50 The Patent
priation and trade secret cannot be obtained here." Id. at 197.
Most uncertainty about the applicability of state common law misappropriation results from
the possibility that federal statutory protection schemes preempt state common law remedies.
Until the United States Supreme Court addresses the preemption issue, it will remain unresolved.
See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980) (preemption
of "fact" protection); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., Inc., 501 F. Supp.
848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (preemption of conversion claim); Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts,
Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 894 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (trial court held that trade secrets claim equivalent
to copyright under certain circumstances and therefore preempted), aff'd on other grounds,
676 F.2d 494 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 827 (1983); Mitchell v. Penton Indus.
Publishing Co., 486 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (plaintiff's broad misappropriation claim
preempted); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D.
Tex. 1979) (preemption). But see Feedman v. Select Information Sys., 221 U.S.P.Q. 848, 851
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (no preemption); Warrington Assocs. Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys. Inc., 522
F. Supp. 367, 368-69 (N.D. Il. 1982) (no preemption); BPI Sys. Inc. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp.
208, 211 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (no preemption); Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (no preemption of "idea" protection).
Other commentators have discussed the preemption issue broadly. See generally Harris, A
Market-Oriented Approach to the Use of Trade Secret or Copyright Protection (Or Both?) for
Software, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 147 (1985); Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is An American
Marriage Possible? 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985) (providing an excellent analysis of the preemption
issue generally, in the context of an argument for a merger between federal copyright law and
the moral rights of creators); Mantle, supra note 40, at 669; Sadler, Federal Copyright Protection
and State Trade Secret Protection: The Case for Partial Preemption, 33 Am. U.L. REV. 667
(1984); Comment, Protection of Proprietary Rights in Computer Programs: A "Basic" Formula
for Debugging the System, 57 ST. JoHNs L. REV. 92 (1982).
In the patent area, preemption is well established. State unfair competition laws are preempted
by federal "design patent" laws. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234
(1964).,State trade secret laws, however, are not preempted by federal patent laws. Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
49. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
50. The requirement that a patent applicant demonstrate that a claimed invention will
potentially benefit society is consistent with the constitutional goal of "promot[ing] the Progress
of Science." Patents, however, are legal monopolies and consequently are an exception to
American society's general aversion to any form of unregulated monopoly power. For example,
Thomas Jefferson, who generally opposed monopolies, supported the creation of legal mono-
polies thiough patent grants and drafted the first Patent Act. He gave the following reasons
for his view: "Certainly an inventor ought to be allowed the right to the benefit of his invention
for some certain time .... Nobody wishes more than I do that ingenuity should receive liberal
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
Act of 195211 requires that a claimed invention satisfy the requirements of
subject matter, utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. 2
Section 1015 of the Patent Act contains the subject matter requirement:
that an invention must be a new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter in order to merit patent protection.54 The United
States Supreme Court interprets section 101 in a way that limits the protection
that patent law can provide to computer programs." Under the "mental
steps" doctrine, 6 for example, a process such as a computer program that
consists of steps which can be performed mentally is not patentable subject
matter."
The Court's principal patent decisions on software protection are difficult
to reconcile. In Gottschalk v. Benson,58 a 1972 case, the Court considered
encouragement." 5 WRITINGS oF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (H. Washington ed. 1807), cited in
Note, The Policy Implications of Granting Patent Protection to Computer Software: An
Economic Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 147, 162 (1984).
51. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982). This is the most recent and comprehensive patent legislation
that Congress has passed. For a discussion of the 1952 Patent Act and subsequent changes, see
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1965).
52. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1982). For a more detailed discussion of the Patent Act's
requirements of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness, see P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUN-
DAMENTALS §§ 7.01-9.05 (2d ed. 1985).
53. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Section 101 states: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title." Id.
54. Id.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 58-61.
56. The mental steps doctrine holds that a process which can be broken down into a series
of mental steps that can be performed in the mind is not patentable subject matter. See In re
Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951). In 1966 the Patent and Trademark Office determined
that computer programs were not proper subject matters for patent. 1968 OFFICIAL GUIDE PAT.
OFFICE 829-30. In so concluding, the Patent Office relied on cases such as Abrams. One
rationale for restricting the patentability of computer programs is that, since the degree of
patent protection is very great, the requirements of patent eligibility for mental processes, ideas,
logic, and scientific principles should be stringent in order to promote public access to these
valuable concepts. P. ROSENBURG, supra note 52, at § 2A.
57. At one time, the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals rejected the doctrine as applied
to computer programs. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), modified on rehearing,
415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). In Prater, the court held that the patent eligibility of a process
was not destroyed merely because the steps in the process could be performed by the human
mind. Id. at 1389.
58. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). Benson is often cited for the proposition that ideas or mental
processes are not patentable subject matter. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
309 (1980) (court cites Benson for proposition that abstract ideas are not patentable); Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587 (1978) ("Benson applied the established rule that a law of nature
cannot be the subject of a patent"). The Benson Court concluded that abstract intellectual
concepts and mental processes, though newly discovered, were not patentable because they
represent the "basic tools of scientific and technological work." 409 U.S. at 67. See also
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1876) ("[an idea of itself is
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the patentability of a programming method, for general-purpose digital
computers, to convert signals from binary-coded form to pure binary form.5 9
By use of the mental steps doctrine, the Court equated the programming
method with the underlying, unpatentable mathematical formula used to
make the calculations.6 The Court affirmed the denial of the plaintiff's
patent request, and concluded that the program was not a patentable process
under section 101 of the Patent Act. 6 1 In contrast to the Benson decision,
the Court in Diamond v. Diehre2 granted a patent on a computerized process
for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured products. 6 While the
Diehr opinion followed the Benson definition of software as an unpatentable
algorithm, the Court viewed the innovation in this case to be an improved
industrial process rather than a mathematical formula. When viewed in light
of the Benson case, the Diehr decision suggests that processes that use
computers may be patented, but that patent protection does not extend to
software programs themselves.
The Court's understanding of software as the physical embodiment of
algorithms underlies the Court's refusal to extend patent protection liberally
to software. 64 Also, most software programs cannot satisfy the strict tests
of nonobviousness and novelty required by sections 102 and 103 of the
Patent Act.65 Patent protection for computer programs is therefore limited
not patentable"); LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) ("[a] principle, in the
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no
one can claim in either of them an exclusive right").
59. 409 U.S. at 65.
60. Id. at 69. This distinction between the underlying mathematical or scientific formula
and the resultant product, calculation, or conclusion, has caused courts some confusion. "While
a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not [a] patentable invention, a novel
and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be." Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). Yet, the courts typically exclude
scientific principles, laws of nature, ideas, and mental processes without defining these concepts.
In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1982). One commentator concluded that "the
distinction the Supreme Court has attempted to draw between patentable processes and math-
ematical algorithms is confusing and unnecessary," as well as "illogical and artificial." Gem-
ignani, Should Algorithms be Patentable? 22 JURIMETRICS J. 326, 334-35 (1982).
61. 409 U.S. at 71-73. The Supreme Court reaffirmed Benson in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584 (1978). The applicant in Flook sought a patent for a computer program that used a
previously undiscovered mathematical formula to calculate process variables and to update
alarm units during catalytic conversion. The Court assumed that Flook's mathematical formula
was the only novel portion of the process and denied the patent, concluding that the formula
was an unpatentable discovery. Id. at 590.
62. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
63. Respondent's process determined proper curing times by continuously measuring the
temperature inside the curing press and repeatedly recalculating the remaining curing time. Id.
at 178.
64. See Note, supra note 50, at 172; Allen, The Patentability of Computer Programs: Merrill
Lynch's Patent for Financial Services System, 59 IND. L.J. 633, 641 (1984).
65. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1982). See MacGrady, supra note 5, at 1039-40.
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under Benson and Diehr to programs that are part of processes that have
traditionally been patentable.
Congress has given patent-like protection to firmware technology under
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984.66 The Act extends protection
to mask works, 67 and grants an owner exclusive rights to reproduce and
distribute such works for a term of ten years. 68 Reverse engineering, 69 when
used to teach or evaluate the concepts embodied in a mask work, is not
considered an infringement of the owner's rights. 70 Because firmware is
tangible, Congress was able to treat it like a patentable type of device. Yet,
there continues to be no protection under current patent law for the large
number of computer programs that are neither embodied in firmware nor
related to a process of production.
B. Trade Secret Protection
Trade secret law originated from the common law tort of unfair compe-
tition, and is a product of the doctrines of property rights, contract rights,
and confidential relationships.7 The United States Supreme Court has ob-
served that trade secret law 72 is intended to maintain the standards of
66. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1982). Section 901(a)(1) defines semiconductor chip products as
the final or intermediate form of any product: "(A) having two or more layers of metallic,
insulating, or semiconductor material, deposited or otherwise placed on, or etched away or
otherwise removed from, a piece of semiconductor material in accordance with a predetermined
pattern; and (B) intended to perform electronic circuitry functions."
67. Section 901(a)(2) defines "mask work" as a series of related images, however fixed
or encoded: "(A) having or representing the predetermined, three-dimensional pattern of metallic,
insulating, or semiconductor material present or removed from the layers of a semiconducto'
chip product and (B) in which series the relation of the images to one another is that each
image has the pattern of the surface of one form of the semiconductor chip product."
68. 17 U.S.C. §§ 903, 905 (1982). See also H.R. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 5750, 5767: "The owner of a mask work
under the Act has the exclusive right to reproduce the work in any way, including any
manufacturing method." The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 263-
73 (1985) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 211)
69. Reverse engineering consists of the process of dismantling an object for the purpose of
ascertaining and analyzing how it was manufactured or formulated. E. KINTNER & J. LAHR,
AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 162-63 (1982); P. ROSENBERG, supra note 52, at §
3.08.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 907 (1982).
71. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1980):
(4) "Trade secret" means information including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
72. Kewanee Oil Co. v Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
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commercial ethics and to encourage invention. The Restatement (First) of
Torts devoted three sections to trade secret principles. 73 Supported by those
sections, trade secret protection evolved in virtually every American juris-
diction.74 Recently, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.75 The Uniform Act establishes the principles of
common law trade secret protection, which had previously evolved unevenly
among the states. 76
The scope of trade secret protection is broad, 77 but several requirements
must be met for trade secret status to accrue. The Restatement sets out six
factors relevant to finding a trade secret,78 but the essential elements are
secrecy, novelty, and value; 79 secrecy is of prime importance.8" A trade secret
must be treated as a secret in-house and must be kept from competitors.
With mass-marketed computer programs, the requirement of secrecy is dif-
73. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757-59 (1939).
74. 12 R. MILORIM, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 (1967 & Supp. 1982).
For an excellent monograph on trade secrets, see R. HOFER, CORPORATE PRACTICE SERIES
PORTFOLIO ON TRADE SECRETS (1984).
75. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (1980).
76. The Uniform Act has been enacted in nine states. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3426 (West
1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-50 (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2001
(1974); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3-1 (Burns 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3320 (1984); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 51:1431 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325c.01 (West 1985); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 47-25.1-01 to -08 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.108.910 (1985).
77. Comment, Trade Secret Protection of Computer Software, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 77, 78-79
(1984).
78. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, comment 6 (1939). The six factors are as follows:
1) External Secrecy-the extent to which the information is known outside the
business;
2) Internal Secrecy-the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in the business;
3) Security Measures-the extent of the measures taken to guard the secrecy of the
information;
4) External Value-the value of the information to the business and to competitors;
5) Investment-amount of effort or money expended in developing the information;
and
6) Accessibility-the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.
79. See R. MILGRIM, supra note 74, at §§ 2.01-09; Comment, supra note 77, at 81-83.
80. Kewanee Oil Co. v Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974). Several cases have ruled
on trade secret protection in the computer area. See University Computing Co. v. Lykes-
Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974) (restrictive use agreement preserved trade
secret status of plaintiff's software system when abused by its joint venturer); Telex v. Inter-
national Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (IBM's elaborate in-house
trade secret protection program met secrecy requirement), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 510
F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Com-Share Inc. v. Computer
Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (trade secret existed based on
evidence of plaintiff's security measures), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972).
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ficult to meet.' Secrecy cannot practically be maintained if the software is
marketed to the public. Although software secrecy can be maintained through
restrictive use agreements and nondisclosure clauses in licensing contracts, 2
mass-marketed software users cannot be bound to such agreements as a
practical matter when they purchase the software outright.
Apart from the uncomfortable fit between trade secret law and computer
technology, efforts to maintain the secrecy of software can pose separate
legal problems. For example, some courts and commentators suggest that
efforts to hold software secrets may violate antitrust laws.83 Another problem
involves contract enforcement; adhesion contracts, which include some cur-
rent license and "shrink wrap" agreements, may be void as unconscionable.
84
81. Maintaining secrecy can be an expensive effort because it involves complex procedures.
See Gilburne & Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for Software Generally and In the Mass
Market, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 211, 221-26 (1982) (discussing secrecy maintenance methods in detail,
including physical control of work premises, equipment access security, employee confidentiality
and non-disclosure agreements, use of license rather than sole agreements, and other restraints
imposed on customers receiving copies of software).
82. See Murphy & Zuck, Trade Secrets and Noncompetitive Agreements-Old Fashioned
Remedies for Problems of High-Tech Industries, 59 FLA. B.J. 37 (1985) (noting that agreements
and non-disclosure clauses in licensing contracts are inadequate in light of practical enforcement
problems).
83. See United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir.
1980) (alleged illegal bundling of software to hardware; government charges that IBM's pricing
and marketing policies created a lease-oriented environment that raised barriers to entry or
expansion in the markets). See also In Re Data General, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984)
(defendant's use of copyrighted computer programs, and defendant's refusal to license the
software except to purchasers of defendant's hardware, constituted an unlawful tying arrange-
ment in violation of Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts); IBM's Antitrust Troubles Are Not
Finished Yet, Bus. WI., Jan. 25, 1982, at 24 (European Community's antitrust commission
charged IBM with abuse of market power in selling computers).
84. The issues surrounding shrink wrap licensing, where the terms and conditions of the
lease are printed on the software product wrapper and are said to become effective and binding
when the seal is broken, are important, yet unresolved. For a survey of the issues surrounding
shrink wrap licenses, see Stern, Shrink- Wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed Software: Enforceble
Contracts or Whistling in the Dark? II RUTO. COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 51 (1985) (only solution
to rental/piracy problem is Congressional action). Currently, only Louisiana has passed shrink
wrap license enforcement legislation. See 28 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. [BNA] No. 693,
at 466 (Aug. 23, 1984). Significantly, the Chicago Bar Association Computer Law Committee,
through the Shrink-Wrap License Legislation Subcommittee, submitted a Software License
Enforcement Act on March 28, 1985 (available from Jean M. Milligan, Chairperson, Gordon
& Glickson, P.C.). Ultimately the Committee hopes to present the Act to the Illinois legislature.
For an excellent discussion of all the issues raised by the shrink wrap law, identified through
a detailed debate between attorney Gregory A. Cierlik defending the law and Illinois software
developer Bruce Tonkin criticizing the law, see Both Sides of the Shrink Wrap Law, CMI.
LAWYER, Nov. 1985 at 18.
Similarly, the question of whether shrink wrap agreements constitute unconscionable adhe-
sion contracts remains unanswered. See Greguras, Protecting Computer Software By Contract,
SOFTWARE PROTECTION, Oct. 1983, at 10; see also Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer
Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264 (1984)
(advocating package inserts as the only practical manner of creating a contract for mass-
marketed computer software). See generally E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CONTRACTS 441-
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Such uncertainties make trade secret protection an inadequate basis for
software protection.s5
III. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Copyright law is the most promising basis for protection of computer
software.86 Although copyright law offers better protection to software
developers than the other alternatives, uncertainties about the status of
computer software in copyright indicates a need for reform of current law.
This section makes a chronological survey of the history of copyright law
by highlighting the historical understanding of copyright as a law to protect
expressions rather than ideas, and to protect only expressions that are
humanly intelligible. As a result of these understandings, copyright law has
inadequately served the needs of the software industry. This section also
discusses recent efforts by Congress and the courts to apply copyright
protection to computer software. As this discussion makes evident, these
efforts have not addressed the core policies of copyright that are unfavorable
to the protection of software.
534 (1980) (contract of adhesion is a type of agreement that requires distinctive treatment
because of inherent danger that one party may impose its will on an unwilling party).
85. See Soloman, The Copyrightability of Computer Software Containing Trade Secrets, 63
WASH. U.L.Q. 131, 152-53 (1985) (while software owner should seek federal copyright protection
instead of relying on uncertain trade protection, even this combination does not provide
"comprehensive legal coverage"). Similarly, a recent report by the Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) noted several deficiencies of software
trade secret protection. CONTU, supra note 8, at 17. First, trade secrets of general programs
are not suited for mass distribution. Second, protection is lost if disclosure of the secret occurs.
Third, substantial costs incurred to maintain a trade secret program increase the cost of software.
Fourth, policy concerns mitigate against trade secrets because they impede the free exchange
and development of ideas. Finally, the lack of uniformity in trade secret law leads to uncertainty.
Id. at 19.
Despite these formidable barriers, however, trade secret is still the protection of choice for
some computer program developers. This is due primarily to the fact that trade secret scheme
protects a greater range of subject matter than either patent or copyright. But for the vast
majority of developers who create application programs for mass distribution to the general
public, trade secret protection is inadequate. See Solomon, The Copyrightability of Computer
Software Containing Trade Secrets, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 131, 152 (1985) (discussing the interplay
between copyright and trade secret protection, suggesting that copyright protection fill more
gaps than trade secret alone); Harris, A Market-Oriented Approach to the Use of Trade Secret
or Copyright Protection (or Both?) for Software. 25 JURIMETRICS J. 147 (1985) (discussing
advantages and disadvantages of trade secret and copyright).
86. See, e.g., Rodau, Protecting Computer Software: After Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), Does Copyright Provide the Best
Protection? 57 TEMP. L.Q. 527 (1984) (copyright law provides best currently available means
of encouraging software development); Note, supra note 84, at 1264 ("software manufacturers
are turning to the copyright laws for protection"); Note, supra note 4, at 171 (copyright is
most appropriate protection for mass-marketed software, but trade secret may be more suitable
for custom designed software); Note, Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. Puts
the Byte Back Into Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 14 GOLDEN GATE L. REV.
281 (1984) (as courts come to understand computer concepts, broad copyright protection for
computer programs will be enforced).
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A. History of Copyright
American copyright law is shaped by two interests that underlie the
copyright system. 7 The first interest is that the copyright monopoly creates
a financial incentive for people to produce intellectual works,88 and produc-
tion of these works promotes the public interest by advancing knowledge
and culture. The second interest is that authors should be able to restrict
dissemination and thus profit from their works. 89 The monopoly is regarded
as providing just compensation for an author's labor to create an expression.
The United States Constitution apparently resolves the tension between the
two interests in favor of the public interest. The Constitution grants Congress
the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by
securing for limited times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings." The grant of Congressional power to provide intel-
lectual property protection is prefaced by the statement that the purpose of
the power is to promote and encourage progress in science and art. Thus,
the Constitution supports the priority of the public good over the property
right of the author.9 1
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the constitutional pref-
erence for the public interest in copyright law in the 1834 case of Wheaton
v. Peters.92 In Wheaton, the Court determined that copyright law was strictly
a statutory creature, and not a common law property right or natural right
of the author.93 The Court viewed the copyright system as a statutory scheme
87. See Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth
of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119 (1983) (an excellent article on history of
copyright system).
88. Id. at 1121 n.4 (citing Hurt & Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56
AM. EcON. REV. 421 (1966)). But see W. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF
THE STATE 21 (1952) (proposing a theoretical framework where public goods should be produced
either by publicly owned producers or by private producers who are totally subsidized by the
government, financed through a general tax increase, and thus providing public goods free of
charge and in sufficient quantity to satisfy demand at a zero price); Borcherding, Competition,
Exclusion and the Optimal Supply of Public Goods, 21 J. LAW & EcON. 111 (1978) (discussing
the distinction in economic theory between public and private goods).
89. See Abrams, supra note 87, at 1130. Accord Glove Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S.
356 (1908); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 590 (1834).
90. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
91. Id.
92. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 590 (1834). One party in this case was Henry Wheaton, editor of an
early Supreme Court reporter commonly known as "Wheaton's Reports." Wheaton had
transferred his copyright in the volumes to the firm of Matthew Cady and Sons. The defendants
in the case had published a series of volumes that reported the same opinions that appeared in
the Wheaton series. Wheaton alleged that this series infringed his copyright; he sought an
injunction. Id. at 594-95.
93. Id. at 661. Accord Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182 (1909); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356 (1908); American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207
U.S. 284 (1907); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
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that gives authors adequate incentive to produce creative works, and provides
the public with easy access to those works. The Court concluded that the
protection of the author was subordinate to the public good.94 Although this
conclusion has been criticized, 9 the Court's public interest doctrine has
remained an important factor in American copyright law to this day. 96 The
doctrine continues to influence copyright case law as well. 97 Under the public
interest doctrine, any attempt to expand or narrow the scope of copyright
protection should be consistent with the traditional policy that favors the
public interest over the property rights of the author.
B. Traditional Elements of Copyright Protection
Only communications deemed "writings" are subject to copyright pro-
tection. The first federal copyright act protected only books, maps, and
charts. 98 Technological advances, however, forced Congress to extend co-
pyright protection to new forms of communication. Both Congress99 and
94. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 661.
95. See E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS
IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 1-53 (1879); I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§§ 4.02[C], 4.03 (1982) (Wheaton was incorrect in its conclusion that copyright was not
recognized by common law as a natural right of the author); J. TAUBMAN, COPYRIGHT AND
ANTITRUST 9 (1960). See also Is Copyright Perpetual? An Examination of the Origin and Nature
of Literary Property, 10 AM. L. REV. 16 (1875) (literary property has its origin in natural law
and not in legislation).
96. As stated in the Committee Report that accompanied the 1909 Copyright Act:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the
Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings,
... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress
of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited
periods the exclusive rights to their writings ....
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions: First,
how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and,
second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The
granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions. confers a
benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) (accompanying the Copyright Act of Mar.
4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976) (repealed
1976)); see also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SEss., REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (Comm.
Print 1961): "As reflected in the Constitution, the ultimate purpose of copyright legislation is
to foster the growth of learning and culture for the public welfare, and the grant of exclusive
rights to authors for a limited time is a means to that end." This report began the legislative
process which culminated in the 1976 Copyright Act.
97. See A & M Records, Inc. v. M.V.C. Distrib. Corp., 574 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1978);
Pittsburgh Athletic Club v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
98. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (1982)).
99. S. REP. No. 6187, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1907): "The term used in the Constitution
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the courts" ) strained to construe the constitutional term "writing" broadly
to protect new forms of expression."" For example, the Supreme Court
recognized Congress' authority to copyright as "writings" such expressions
as photographs,' 2 motion pictures,"'3 and sound recordings.1(  The current
Copyright Act adopts an even broader construction of the term "writing,"
and extends copyright protection to "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine device.""'" This broad definition of the term "writing" has helped
expand copyright protection to encompass new creative mediums. Conse-
quently, the term "writing" is not a formidable hurdle in applying copyright
protection to software."'6
Other conditions for copyright protection are even less stringent than the
"writing" requirement. For example, copyrighted material must have an
"author,"" 7 a term that includes anybody to whom a work "owes its
origin."' 18 The definition is broad enough to apply to works created by a
corporate entity or a group of individuals.' 9 A copyrighted work must also
be "original.""" An original work, for copyright purposes, is one that is
is 'writings.' But Congress has always construed this term broadly, and in doing so has been
uniformly supported by judicial decision."
100. See, e.g., Shaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589, 590 (D.D.C. 1972) (per curiam):
"The Copyright Clause of the Constitution must be interpreted broadly to provide protection
for [the sound recording industry]."
101. See generally Comment, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 47 TENN. L.
REV. 787, 793 (1980) (describing evolution of copyright and how law gradually adapted to new
forms of expression consistent with development of emerging technologies).
102. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53 (1884).
103. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
104. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659.
107. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
108. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (citing
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884)).
109. Such works are considered either "works made for hire" or "joint works." 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(a), (b) (1982). Although a copyright in a work vests in the author or authors of the
work, in the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work
was prepared is considered the author, and the copyright vests in the author, not the preparer.
See, e.g., Samet & Wells, Inc. v. Shalom Toy Co., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 895 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(absent express contractual reservation of copyright in author, title to copyright is held by
employer).
Similarly, joint authorship vests a copyright in each author. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). See also
Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y.) (joint authorship of a single
work, which traditionally contemplated collaboration and common purpose, gives rise to joint
ownership of copyright), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
For a good discussion of issues involved with hired software developers, see Conley & Bryan,
The Tr-atment of Computer Software Works Made for Hire, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 579 (1985).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
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created independently by an author. The work need not be different from
other works in the public domain,'" and the concept of originality does not
encompass intangible factors such as artistic merit." 2 Most works fulfill the
writing, authorship, and originality requirements.
Because copyright is available for a broad spectrum of writings, courts
have attempted to prevent undue extension of copyright protection by nar-
rowly construing the law of copyright infringement." 3 The first major re-
striction on the scope of protection against infringement was developed by
the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden." 4 In Baker, the Court held that it
was not copyright infringement for a person to use a system of accounting
that was described in the plaintiff's copyrighted book. The Court determined
that infringement occurs only when the expression of an idea is taken from
a copyrighted work. There is no infringement, however, when the underlying
idea is copied. This doctrine is labelled the "idea-expression dichotomy;" it
is a guiding principle of copyright law." 5 The idea-expression dichotomy
narrows the scope of copyright infringement. In particular, it limits protec-
tion of computer programs because software, as an expressive medium,
merges an idea and an expression so that the two are coextensive." 16 Because
the essence of software is in its underlying idea and logic, the idea-expression
dichotomy effectively curtails copyright protection for computer software.
The Supreme Court also limited copyright protection in White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,"' a decision that authorized the production
of copies of protected works when the copies are in a form not readable by
humans. In White-Smith, a 1908 case, the Court held that a perforated
111. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976): "[Olriginality
is ... distinguished from novelty; there must be independent creation, but it need not be
invention in the sense of striking uniqueness, ingeniousness, or novelty, since the Constitution
differentiates 'authors' and their 'writings' from 'inventors' and their 'discoveries'." See also
Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863
(1975) (originality is not a prerequisite of copyright and a modicum of creativity may suffice
for a work to be protected); Comment, supra note 101, at 796 (defining originality as independent
creation, not novelty).
112. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (Congress
intended the scope of the copyright statute to include more than traditional fine arts).
113. In order to succeed in a copyright infringement action, "plaintiffs must prove (1) that
defendants copied from their works and (2) that such copying worked an unlawful appropriation
of at least a substantial, protected part of the allegedly infringed work." Bevan v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 601, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
114. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
115. See, e.g., Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch. Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 64 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446
F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 95, at § 2.18.
116. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983)
(court required a showing that the underlying idea cannot be expressed in more than one way
before the idea and expression of the idea will be considered merged). But see I M. NIMMER,
supra note 95, at § 2.181c][2].
117. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
piano roll, which was used to reproduce the tones of a copyrighted musical
composition, was not a "copy" under copyright law.' The Court held that
the term "copy" only included works that were in a form that was humanly
intelligible." 9 The copyright statute protected only tangible works, and not
ideas, from publication and duplication. 20 The Court found that in the case
of music publications, a plaintiff's copyright had been infringed only by the
unauthorized publication of sheet music, and not by the production of the
perforated piano roll.' 2' The idea-expression dichotomy, combined with the
rule that requires humanly intelligible copies to cause infringement,2 limited
the protection available under copyright law in this case.
These traditional doctrines of copyright law pose problems for the pro-
tection of computer software. 2 ' Although courts have extended copyright
protection to expressions that are primarily of a communicative or expressive
nature-art, literature, music, and audiovisual works-computer software is
uniquely valuable as a tool comprised of logic, ideas, and concepts for use
in solving problems.'24 The basic concepts of copyright infringement must
be reformulated if copyright law is to encompass software.
C. Reform of Copyright Law to Protect Software
During the early stages of the computer era, the computer industry paid
little attention to copyright protection.' 25 The Copyright Office accepted the
first request to register a program in 1964.126 At the time, copyright law did
not state whether a program constituted a "writing of an author" and
whether reproduction of a program constituted "copying." The Copyright
Office accepted the program for registration in accordance with its policy
of resolving doubtful issues in favor of registration. 27 During the next
fourteen years, only 1,205 programs were submitted for registration.,28
118. Id. at 17.
119. Id.
120. Id. at II.
121. Id. at 18.
122. The requirement of humanly intelligible copies was overruled by § 102(a) of the current
Copyright Act, which extends protection to forms "from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. " 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. 1 1983) (emphasis added).
123. See Caswell, supra note 25, at 391; J. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 4 (copyright protection
was not initially appropriate for software protection).
124. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
125. See Puckett, The Limits of Copyright and Patent Protection for Computer Programs,
16 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP] 81 (1968).
126. United States Copyright Office, Copyright Registration for Computer Programs, re-
printed in I I BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 361 (1964).
127. Id. at 368.
128. CONTU, supra note 8, at 34. Over three-fourths of the 1,205 programs registered
during this period were owned by the two largest hardware manufacturers, IBM and Burroughs
Corporation. Id.
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Two developments preceded the passage of significant computer software
legislation. First, Congress revised the old copyright law with the 1976
Copyright Act. 2 9 The Act made few changes in the copyright status of
computer software.' 30 The Act did identify software as copyrightable subject
matter; the category of "computer programs" was included among the list
of protectable "literary works."'' The Act also established that a machine
reproduction of a computer program is a "copy.'' 32 Although Congress
intended to protect computer programs through copyright by these amend-
ments, the Act retained its strict adherence to the idea-expression dichotomy
that denied copyright coverage to computer software in earlier times. "
The second development took place in 1974, when Congress established
the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU). ' 4 Congress created CONTU to research, study, and recommend
legislative changes related to computer programs, data bases, and other
software matters. In its 1978 report,'35 the Commission unanimously agreed
that a computer program in written form should be eligible for copyright
protection. There was disagreement among the Commission members, how-
ever, about whether copyright protection should extend to programs pub-
lished in object code form on punch cards, magnetic tape, or semi-conductor
chips. The Commission majority concluded that such forms should receive
protection because the different forms reflected differences only in storage
media and not in the nature of the programs themselves.' 36
The CONTU majority reasoned that market realities-the growth of per-
sonal computers, the decline of programs tailored for single purpose ma-
129. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982)). The Act eliminated common-law copyright, simplified copyright procedure, and rejected
the distinction between the protection of published and unpublished works. See T. HARRIS,
THE LEGAL GUIDE TO SOFTWARE PROTECTION 43-44 (1985).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976) (repealed 1980). The Congressional Committee reports reflected
a desire by the lawmakers to preserve the status quo while awaiting CONTU's recommendations.
See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 106, at 116; H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
72 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5810, 5813.
131. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 106, at 54: "The term 'literary works' . . . also includes
computer data bases, and computer programs to the extent they incorporate authorship in the
programmer's expression of ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves."
132. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
133. Id. § 102(b). Section 102 was added to ensure that "although the programmer's 'literary
expression,' as embodied in a program, would be copyrightable, his ideas, system and meth-
odology would not." U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF
1976, at 3:4 (1977).
134. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 94-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 201 (1982)).
135. CONTU, supra note 8, at 13.
136. Id. at 10. The majority analogized computer storage media to magnetic tapes used to
store music. The majority stated that both "are sets of information in a forum which, when
passed over a magnetized head, cause minute currents to flow in such a way that desired
physical work is accomplished." Id.
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chines, and the emergence of independent software houses-made copyright
a valuable means of protection.'37 The majority returned to the fundamental
rationale of copyright, the public interest in progress and dissemination of
the benefits of computer technology, as a justification for enhanced copyright
protection of software. The CONTU majority recommended that the Copy-
right Act be amended to include computer programs as a proper subject
matter of copyright, and to repeal section 117,38 which expressly disaffirmed
certain forms of copyright coverage for computer programs. CONTU also
recommended that owners of copies of computer programs be permitted
under copyright law to use or adapt copies for their use. 39
D. The Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980
Two years after receiving CONTU's report, Congress enacted the Com-
puter Software Copyright Act of 1980. 40 Pursuant to CONTU's recommen-
dations, the Act amended section 101 by adding the definition of a computer
program to the list of existing statutory definitions.' 41 Additionally, the Act
replaced the old section 117 with a new section 117, 42 which contains
137. Id. at II.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1978) (repealed 1980). The law states in relevant part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116 and 118, this title does
not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights with
respect to the use of a work in conjunction with automatic systems capable of
storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information, or in conjunction with
any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to works under the
law ....
139. CONTU, supra note 8, at 12. In a dissent, Commissioner Hersey disputed the Com-
mission's final recommendations and challenged the appropriateness of using copyright law to
protect computer programs. Hersey's dissent warned of the "subtle, dehumanizing danger" of
the majority view. Id. at 27-37 (Hersey, C., dissenting). For a detailed article analyzing
Commissioner Hersey's dissent, see Koenig, Software Copyright: The Conflict Within CONTU,
27 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 340 (1980).
While Commissioner Melville Nimmer agreed with the majority's recommendations, he would
limit copyrightability to programs that themselves produce copyrightable output. Thus, he would
allow registration for programs which created data bases, managed a legal retrieval system, or
played a computer game, but not for one which controlled the heating system in an apartment
house. CONTU, supra note 8 at 26-27 (Nimmer, C., concurring).
140. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-516, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 116 (1982)).
141. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982): "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions
to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." See
CONTU, supra note 8, at 26-37.
142. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). The new § 117 provides:
Limitations on exclusive rights: computer programs. Notwithstanding the provi-
sions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer
program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that
computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
1016 [Vol. 34:993
COMBATING SOFTWARE PIRACY
language that details the rights of owners of copies of computer software to
copy or adapt these programs for their own use. Although the Act's legislative
history is only contained in a short paragraph in a committee report, 43 the
committee stated that the Act "embodies the recommendations of [CONTU]
with respect to clarifying the law of copyright of computer software."'44 The
CONTU report is therefore legitimate authority for interpreting the Act.
The computer industry was satisfied with most aspects of the new Act.
Software producers were no longer subjected to section 117's non-committal
stand on copyright protection for software. 45 The Act also provided a broad
definition of "computer program,' ' 46 and the new section 117 clarified the
rights of those who rightfully owned copies of computer programs. Owners
now clearly had the right to make archival copies and to modify or adapt
the program as needed for their own use.147
E. Judicial Decisions
Although computer software has been given copyright protection in various
forms since 1964, 48 courts have struggled to apply copyright principles to
computer software. Software copyright cases have shown that copyright
common law rules do not apply to works, such as computer programs, that
judges cannot understand. Courts must compare software products that are
distinguishable only by non-obvious technical characteristics. The problem
of the lack of technical experience is compounded when courts develop and
apply tests that use indefinite standards.
One of the most difficult issues in software copyright law is whether object
code is copyrightable. An object code is a program that consists of machine
language instructions. Only trained systems analysts can comprehend these
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is
used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer
program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may
be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such
copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights
in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the author-
ization of the copyright owner.
143. H.R. REP. No. 1307 (pt. 1), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6460, 6482, 6483.
144. Id. For a discussion of the impact of the CONTU report and the extent of software
copyright protection, see Wharton, Use and Expression: The Scope of Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs, 5 COMPUTER L. REV. 433 (1985).
145. See supra note 125 at 89-90.
146. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 117(2) (1982); Michaelson & Einschlag, Legal Defenses Against Piracy,
ELECTRONICS WEEK, Mar. 4, 1985, at 53 (software protection under current legal theories is "a
forest of facts, fantasies, methods and results").
148. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
101719851
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
programs. 49 In 1982, the Third Circuit, in Williams Electronics, Inc. v.
Arctic International, Inc.,'"° addressed the issue of whether an object code,
embodied in an ROM, was copyrightable. In Williams Electronics, the
plaintiffs sought to enjoin Arctic International from infringing on the plain-
tiff's copyrighted audiovisual works. 5 ' The defendant contended that, under
the 1976 Copyright Act, the programs in question were not copyrightable
because they did not meet the statutory requirement of fixation in a tangible
form.' The defendant argued that copyright protection was not available
for ROM chips because they were "utilitarian objects or machine parts.'" 53
The court rejected the defendant's argument, basing its decision on the
wording of the 1976 Copyright Act. 5 4 The court concluded that the dupli-
cation of a copyrighted computer program embodied in an ROM chip
amounted to copyright infringement.'
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 156 the Third Circuit
again addressed the issue of whether an object code embodied in an ROM
chip could be protected by copyright. Apple Computer filed a suit alleging
that Franklin Computer infringed Apple's copyrights. Franklin manufactured
and marketed computers that used software developed for use with the
popular Apple II computer. To assure that the Franklin software was
compatible with the Apple, Franklin copied Apple's operating system com-
puter programs.' A district court denied Apple's request to enjoin Franklin
149. "Object code" is defined as a computer software program that consists of a sequence
of machine language instructions. See Comment, supra note 31, at 1725. As such, object code
is machine readable code and is directly intelligible to the computer. Id. For a discussionof the
issues involved in copyright protection of object code, see Baldy, Computer Copyright Law:
An Emerging Form of Protection for Object Code Software After Apple v. Franklin, 5
COMPUTER L.J. 233 (1984).
150. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
151. Id. at 871.
152. Id. at 873. Section 102 provides, in part:
(a) Copyright protection subsists . . .in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device ....
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) (emphasis added). The fixation requirement is defined in § 101, in
relevant part:
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated for a period of more than transitory duration.
Id. § 101.
153. 685 F.2d at 874.
154. Id. at 877.
155. Id. The court affirmed the final injunction order enjoining the defendant from infringing
plaintiff's copyrighted computer program and audiovisual works. The court remanded the case
only as to the finding that the infringement was willful and deliberate. Id. at 878.
156. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
157. Id. at 1245 (Franklin did not dispute that it copied Apple programs). Operating system
computer programs generally manage the internal functions of the computer or facilitate the
use of other programs, Id. at 1243.
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from its infringment of Apple's copyright because under the 1976 Copyright
Act it was unclear whether object code was copyrightable.'58
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court and
decided that an object code is copyrightable.5 9 The court reviewed section
102, the CONTU report, and the legislative history of the 1980 Copyright
Act. The court found that although section 102(a) did not expressly list
computer programs as works of authorship, the history of the 1980 Copyright
Act suggested that object codes should be considered copyrightable as literary
works.' 60 Moreover, the court held that the language of the 1980 Act made
computer programs subject to copyright protection. 16'
The Third Circuit's contribution to computer copyright law in the Apple
Computer decision was to distinguish between software products that can
be copyrighted as the expression of an idea, and the idea behind a software
program that is itself uncopyrightable. That is, when other programs can be
written or created that perform the same function as the original program,
the original program is the initial expression of the idea and thus subject to
copyright. 62 This test, although theoretically elegant, is difficult to apply in
practice because of the lack of objective standards that are necessary to
protect the copyright owner from potential infringement. Courts that use
the Apple Computer test will experience analytical difficulties in separating
ideas from expressions; these difficulties will result in inconsistent decisions
and uncertainty for software designers.
Another problem addressed by courts is the determination of what con-
stitutes a substantially similar product in the context of computer software.
A substantially similar product is one that, in "total concept and feel,"
resembles a protected product and therefore infringes the copyright. 63 The
Seventh Circuit addressed the substantial similarity issue in Atari, Inc. v.
North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp. 64 In Atari, the plaintiff
158. 545 F. Supp. 812, 825 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 104
S. Ct. 690 (1984).
159. 714 F.2d at 1247-49. The court also reaffirmed its holding in Williams regarding the
copyrightability of object code embodied in ROM chips.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1249. A second issue addressed by the Third Circuit in Franklin was whether
operating system programs were copyrightable. Id. at 1245. Franklin argued that operating
system programs were not copyrightable because they were per se excluded from protection
under both the express language of section 101(b) of the Copyright Act and Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99 (1879). 714 F.2d at 1250. For a discussion of Baker, see supra notes 114-15 and
accompanying text. Franklin argued that Baker constituted an "insuperable obstacle to the
copyrightability of Apple's operating systems." 714 F.2d at 1251. The court rejected Franklin's
arguments as inconsistent with the statutory language of § 101, which makes no distinction
between application programs and operating systems. Id. at 1252.
162. 714 F.2d at 1253 (citing Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st
Cir. 1967)).
163. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
164. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
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sued North American to enjoin it from marketing a video game, "K.C.
Munchkin," which in many ways resembled Atari's product, "PAC-MAN."
The court held that in order to determine whether the parties' products were
substantially similar, it had to determine whether the defendant's work was
so similar to the plaintiff's that a reasonable person would conclude that
the defendant unlawfully appropriated a protected expression.' 6 The court
acknowledged that such a test was necessarily subjective.' 66 After the court
applied the test in the subject case, it held that Atari proved substantial
similarity between its product and North American's. 67 This test, like the
test devised in Apple Computer, suffers from a lack of definition and
specificity. The test can lead to divergent results and uncertainty for software
designers. 61
A third software copyright problem, raised in the 1985 case of SAS
Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc., 69 is the determination of
what constitutes a "derivative work" among computer programs. A deriv-
ative work is one that is "based upon one or more preexisting works," such
as a translation, an annotation, or an editorial revision. 70 Such works, unless
authorized by the holder of the protected work, are copyright infringements.
The dispute in SAS Institute arose from a 1981 licensing agreement between
the SAS Institute and S & H Computer Systems, under which S & H paid
SAS Institute $4500 to lease its statistical analysis software. The licensing
agreement stipulated that S & H was to use the SAS program on only one
165. Id. at 614 (citing Scott v. WKJG Inc., 376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 832 (1967)).
166. Id. at 615.
167. Id. at 617-19. The court stated: "Based on an ocular comparison of the two works, we
conclude that plaintiffs clearly showed likelihood of success. Although not 'virtually identical'
to PAC-MAN, K.C. Munchkin captures the 'total concept and feel' of and is substantially
similar to PAC-MAN." Id. at 619.
168. For a comprehensive discussion of tests to determine infringement in computer software,
see Note, supra note 84 (substantial similarity test is unworkable in computer software context;
an iterative standard to determine infringement is more appropriate), and Perelman, Proving
Copyright Infringement of Computer Software: An Analytical Framework, 18 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 919 (1985).
169. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn.), appeal dismissed, No. 83-5435 (6th Cir. Apr. I, 1985)
(available Aug. 24, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Cases file). In another recent but less
significant case, Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.
Pa. 1985), the court addressed the issue of copyright infringement of a software program that
had been translated from an EDL language version to a BASIC language version. The plaintiff
alleged the the defendant's programmer used the EDL source code to arrive at a translation to
BASIC language capable of running on IBM personal computers. The second version was
virtually identical to the original in mode of operation and function performed. Id. at 1309-
10. The court stated that the "expression of the idea embodied in a computer program is
protected by the copyright laws even though it must be altered and refined . . . and require
different source codes" to be used in another computer. The court concluded that the IBM
version infringed on the earlier version even though it was not a literal copy. Id. at 1315.
170. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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specifically identified IBM computer located at Tennessee State University.171
The court found that the licensing agreement prohibited S & H from further
distribution of the program, from allowing timesharing use of the SAS
program, and from making copies of SAS's program except for backup
purposes. 172 The court noted that SAS invested approximately five years and
more than eighteen man-years of labor into developing the program's source
code. 173
Notwithstanding the licensing agreement's limitations, a small group of
Vanderbilt University faculty ignored the agreement and adapted the program
for its own use. 74 The group also sold its adaptation of the program for
profit. 17 Based on evidence produced at trial, the court concluded that S &
H's purpose in licensing the program was to obtain SAS's source code for
use in the preparation of its product.176 The court found that S & H exploited
the SAS source code' 77 to develop its own program. Finally, the court held
that S & H's use of the copyrighted SAS source code to develop the adapted
program made the latter program a derivative work of the SAS product and
therefore an infringement of SAS's copyright. 78
171. 605 F. Supp. at 821. In addition, the license agreement permitted S & H to modify the
SAS program only for its own use, and to employ the program as part of an updated work.
However, no redistribution of such an updated work was allowed. The license agreement also
granted to S & H only those rights enumerated in the agreement. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 818. According to the court:
The source code for a computer program is the series of instructions to the
computer for carrying out the various tasks which are performed by the program,
expressed in a programming language which is easily comprehensible to appropriately
trained human beings. The source code serves two functions. First, it can be treated
as comparable to text material, and in that respect can be printed out, read and
studied, and loaded into a computer's memory, in much the same way that docu-
ments are loaded into word processing equipment. Second, the source code can be
used to cause the computer to execute the program. To accomplish this, the source
code is "compiled." This involves an automatic process, performed by the computer
under the control of a program called a "compiler," which translates the source
code into "object code," which is very difficult to comprehend by human beings.
The object code version of the program is then loaded into the computer's memory
and causes the computer to carry out the program function.
Id.
174. Id. at 819. The court found that a former part-time Vanderbilt employee transferred to
S & H, while three full-time faculty members formed a limited partnership in order to financially
profit from the conversion scheme.
175. Id. at 820. The scheme consisted of a "Development Agreement" between the partnership
and S & H to develop "a set of computer programs, which provide integrated statistical analysis
similar to an existing statistical system known as SAS," after which the partnership would
purchase the product for 11407o of development costs. Id.
176. Id. at 820.
177. Id. at 822.
178. Id. at 829.
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To determine whether S & H had "copied" the SAS source code, the
court applied the standard of substantial similarity. 79 Through an exami-
nation of the evidence, the court concluded that the S & H program was
substantially similar to that of SAS.80 Since the S & H program fell within
the definition of a derivative work'81 under section 101, the court found that
S & H engaged in improper conduct in achieving its "conversion" of SAS.," 2
The court decided SAS Institute by use of traditional copyright principles
because the facts of the case were simple and clear. Unfortunately, copyright
infringement is not so easily determined in most computer software cases.' 83
The SAS Institute decision is significant because it places emphasis on the
actual use of a protected work to create a derivative work, rather than on
the similarity of the two works in isolation from their development. The
case therefore stands for the proposition that, in computer software copyright
cases, the history of a work's development should be as closely scrutinized
as the end product. Because the decision was dismissed on appeal,8 4 SAS
Institute is especially significant as it is the only case in a complex and
uncertain area of litigation.'8 '
F. Shortcomings of Present Copyright Protection
The Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980816 clarifies the ground rules
for software copyright protection. Commentators are dissatisfied with the
179. Id. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
180. 605 F. Supp. at 830.
181. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) states in part:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adopted. A work consisting
of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as
a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
182. 605 F. Supp. at 830.
183. See Soocher, Software-Infringement Ruling Prompts Debate, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 22, 1985,
at II (quoting J. Marcellino, attorney for Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, Washington, D.C.).
Mr. Marcellino noted that courts approach infringement suits as "lay observer[s]" who deter-
mine whether there existed a substantial similarity between the works in dispute "at some frozen
moment in time." Id. He noted, however, that with computer technology, "what was similar
once can be made to look different five minutes later." Id.
184. SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc., No. 83-5435 (6th Cir. Apr. 1,
1985) (available Aug. 24, 1985, on LEXIS, Gerifed library, Cases file).
185. See, e.g., Soocher, supra note 183, at II. According to Mr. Soocher, some experts
believe that the decision will help hundreds of plaintiffs to succeed in pending software copyright
litigation, while other experts minimize the impact of the decision by describing it as merely an
extension of the concept of derivative rights in intellectual property to software.
186. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 117 (1982)).
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new law,'87 however, and the computer industry still requires adequate legal
protection for software.' 8 An ideal copyright system for computer software
would be one that meets the goals of both the government and the software
industry. A balanced copyright law must provide software developers with
strong remedies and effective procedures against infringement, while also
encouraging the creation and distribution of beneficial technologies for the
public good. Although copyright law adequately meets these needs for
traditional media, the statute denies this protection to computer software.
This section describes the statutory rights that are granted to copyright
owners, and shows how the copyright statute, by balancing public good
against private property interest, limits the copyright owner's rights. The
section will then demonstrate how the Act fails to provide needed protection
to the software industry.
187. See generally Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of Computer
Software Copyright Cases, 6 COMPUTER L.J. 55 (1985) (pointing out uncertainty and confusion
with applying traditional legal concepts to highly technological factual setting, and offering a
new model for software copyright litigation); Kelso & Rebay, Problems of Interpretation Under
the 1980 Computer Amendment, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1001 (1983) (elucidating general
criticisms of the 1980 Act).
188. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., ADAPSO newsletter, March 28, 1985. See
supra note 5. ADAPSO spends a great deal of time combating the piracy problem for the entire
software industry. The ADAPSO Software Piracy Committee has proposed meeting the problem
on three fronts: (1) a public relations campaign to inform the public that unauthorized copying
of software is theft; (2) technological key coding and sophisticated diskette-based encryption
devices aimed at restricting user access or ability to copy; and (3) litigation and legislative action
aimed at promoting stronger legal protection and effective enforcement. ADAPSO encourages
cooperation and voluntary agreements between all software developers to effectuate these plans.
However, frustration among software developers continues. One computer industry magazine
devoted an entire issue to widespread piracy problems. Special Section: Software Piracy,
INFOWORLD, Mar. 22, 1982, at 31-47. Some developers have even gone so far as to loan their
software to a customer, hoping only that if the customer is happy with the product, the customer
will voluntarily pay a set fee. This concept, called "Shareware," depends upon a person's sense
of honesty, and anticipates that the user will send in the payment to become a registered owner.
Some schemes even encourage copying because the developer pays a sales commission when a
copy is made for someone who also registers as an owner. See A Better Way to Buy Software?
CHANGING TIMES, Mar., 1985, at 20.
Some commentators conclude that traditional intellectual property laws are so inadequate
that a completely new form of protection is necessary to meet the needs of software developers.
See, e.g., Comment, Softright, A Legislative Solution to the Problem of User's and Producers'
Rights in Computer Software, 44 LA. L. REv. 1413 (1984) (suggesting hybrid legislation "to
tailor the law to the needs of programmers and developers, as well as users, to discourage
unwarranted copying of software, and to make the enforcement of intellectual property rights
in software a practical reality"). The article also discusses why people make unauthorized copies
of' software. Id. at 1450-54; see also Anderson, Software Law: He's Forging a New Specialty
Where Law, Technology Meet, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 1983, at 3B, col. 3 (calling for major
revisions of all intellectual property protection schemes for software); Kelso & Rebay, supra
note 187, at 1029.
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The present copyright statute affords a copyright owner several specific
and exclusive rights. Under section 106,19 the copyright owner has the
exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work,' 90 prepare derivative works
of the original, 9 and distribute copies by sale, 92 rental, or lease. 93 In some
media forms, the copyright owner has the exclusive right to perform and
display the work publicly. 94 Thus, section 106 delineates copyright owners'
specific, exclusive rights, and any infringement constitutes a violation of
those rights.
Such rights, however, are expressly limited by sections 107 through 118. 91
With the exception of section 117, these sections provide that some uses of
copyrighted material are not an infringement. The rationale for limiting
exclusive rights is the need for the general public to utilize copyrighted works
in specific instances without the threat of infringement. The exceptions to
exclusive rights are supposed to be narrow enough to prevent economic
detriment to the copyright owner. 96 Thus, the copyright statute allows certain
189. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Section 106 provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
190. The exclusive right of reproduction is the true essense of copyright. See, e.g., Granite
Music Corp. v. United Artists, 532 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1976) (statutory copyright protects against
unlawful reproduction of original work); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Cataldea Fine Arts, 191 F.2d
99 (2d Cir. 1951) (copyright confers an exclusive right to copy protected work and a right not
to have others copy it).
191. For definition of derivative work see supra note 181. See also Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street
and Smith, 204 F. 398 (8th Cir.) (exclusive right of authors to dramatize and translate their
copyrighted works is part of copyright itself), cert. denied, 231 U.S. 755 (1913).
192. Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610 (E.D. Pa. 1924) (copyright holder had exclusive right
to sell copyrighted works).
193. Westway Theatre v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 30 F. Supp. 830 (D. Md.)
(legal effect of copyright is to create in owner an exclusive property right with incidental power
to lease or license use by others), aff'd, 113 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1940).
194. Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939) (singers and actors have an exclusive
right in their art and may prohibit an unauthorized public performance); see also Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (owners of copyrighted motion picture film
have exclusive rights to exhibit it).
195. See supra note 189.
196. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110 (4), (6) (1982). Section 110 states, in part: "and not for
private financial gain . . . without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage."
See also H.R. REp. No. 1476, supra note 106, at 4 (provision expressly adopts the 'no profit
motive' limitation).
1985] COMBATING SOFTWARE PIRACY 1025
infringements when the conduct is designed to promote greater public interest
and not to economically benefit the infringer.
Section 10719 is the paradigm model of the limitation sections. This section
provides that portions of a copyrighted work may be copied for "fair use"
in criticism, news reports, scholarship, and other related fields. Whether
such use is "fair use" depends on three factors: whether the use was
commercial or editorial, what the nature of the copyrighted work is, and
how much of the work was copied. All subsequent sections follow section
107's inherent balancing concept by defining the circumstances under which
a person has the right to use copyrighted material.
Such balancing is employed in copyright protection of computer software,
though only in form. Protection of software, covered exclusively by section
117, is limited by that section's expansive exceptions to exclusive rights. The
1980 Copyright Act defines the unauthorized input of a work into a computer
as an infringing act.'98 Section 117, however, incorporates major exceptions
regarding what constitutes infringement of copyrighted computer pro-
grams.' Pursuant to the CONTU recommendations, section 117(1) now
provides that it is not a copyright infringement "for the owner2°° of a copy
of computer program to make or authorize the making of a copy."'20' The
owner's right to freely transfer software presents a major problem in the
context of mass-marketed computer software, because it encourages piracy. 202
Section 117 also presently allows a non-copyright holder to copy a program
if making the copy is an "essential step ' 2 3 in the use of a program in
conjunction with a machine. This exemption is broad; it legitimizes any use
of a program remotely related to the user's subjective need of essential steps
197. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include-
(I) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
198. CONTU, supra note 8, at 12. See also 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 95, at § 8.08.
199. See supra note 142.
200. This was the only departure from the CONTU recommendations that refer to "the
rightful processor." See CONTU, supra note 8, at 1.
201. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1982) (footnote added).
202. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text; see also Wharton, Use and Expression: The
Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 433 (1985) (analysis
of copyright protection and unique nature of software copy).
203. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1982).
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in connection with the use of a program. With such discretion by the user,
the software copyright owner has no control over the extent of the use or
misuse of the work.2°0 Section 117 is inconsistent with both the letter and
the spirit of traditional copyright law.
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL-CLOSING LOOPHOLES
The extent of uncertainty in the area of software protection is reflected
in the high volume of litigation,2 5 and the number of scholarly2°6 and
204. See Kelso & Rebay, supra note 187:
The statute seems overly vague in regardi to this problem. While the Commission
indicates that the adaptation right 'could only be exercised so long as [it] did not
form the interests of the copyright proprietor,' this apparently broad protection of
the copyright owner's interest is not reflected in the language of the statute.
Id. at 1030 (citing CONTU, supra note 8, at 13).
205. See, e.g., West, supra note 2, at 18.19 (software copyright is one of fastest growing
areas of litigation, with a great deal of time spent on unresolved issues).
One expert in the computer litigation area, however, has stated that while many cases alleging
violations of computer software protection are filed, few cases reach the trial stage because the
parties are afraid to risk the uncertainties. Most cases are settled out of court, which has
resulted in a paucity of case law in this area. Telephone interview with Robert Greene Sterne,
of Saidman, Sterne, Kessler & Goldstein, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 15, 1985).
While domestic litigation over copyright protection of software continues, another area of
uncertainty is the response of some countries in providing adequate international protection for
computer programs. For an article sketching the issues and noting trends toward a worldwide
copyright protection, see Siber, The Worldwide Legal Status of Software Protection, NAT. L.J.,
Jan. 21, 1985, at 20.
206. See generally D. BROOKS, COMPUTER LAW 342-76 (1985). A common scheme is to restrict
distribution of programs to license instead of sale. This allows contractual control of the licensee
in the form of conditional contracts, service contracts, and nondisclosure clauses. Under the
service contract approach, the licensor promises to continually update and improve the software
in exchange for the licensee's promise to restrict access. The conditional contract may provide
for breach and remedy of liquidated damages upon the occurrence of an event, perhaps the
vendees attempt to copy or break code.
Another approach advocated is the attempt to maintain concurrent trade secret and copyright
protection. See, e.g., Comment, Simultaneous Copyright and Trade Secret Protection for
Computer Programs, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037 (1983). While simultaneous copyright and
trade secret protection increases the scope and degree of protection, it may be impossible if the
two are deemed to be mutually exclusive by action of law (preemption) or physical impossibility.
The latter may be true because the Copyright Act requires registration and thus under the
Freedom of Information Act allows publication. Id. at 1045. Registration of the program may
preclude trade secret remedies. Registering only object (machine readable) code may solve this
problem. However, it is technologically possible to read even object code and obtain the secret
information. Other commentators advocate special exemption applications when the registrant
only sends the first and last twenty-five pages of the program, and then make the remainder a
series of gibberish or unnecessary code. Still others seek to analogize their secrecy to the
Copyright Office's special provisions for standardized test questions (only a one-fourth inch
strip of each page is registered). Yet these attempts have not been accepted by the Copyright
Office.
Another proposal is to turn over the program to the control of an escrow trustee or agent.
See generally Nycum, Understanding Escrow Complexities, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 323 (1984). If the
licensee erases his copy or needs the system debugged, the escrow trustee is obliged by the
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legislative20 7 proposals that are aimed at reforming the copyright statute. The
legislative reforms proposed in the Appendix of this Comment are designed
to redress many of the problems apparent with section 117 of the Copyright
Act. The reforms are intended to place software copyright owners on an
equal footing with copyright owners of works fixed in traditional media.
The proposed statute is constructed based on the balancing approach outlined
in section 107.208.
Section 1 of the proposed statute states the limits on the exclusive rights
of owners of software. Subsection l(a) of the proposed statute identifies the
circumstances under which a computer program may be copied without
infringement. Such specificity, which the present section 117 lacks, is nec-
essary to closely circumscribe the extent of the use of authorized copies.
Subsection l(b) narrowly defines the scope and use of derivative works in
the context of computer programs. 209 This section indicates that the copy
owner is precluded from making more than one derivative program. 210 Fi-
nally, subsection l(c) identifies those persons who are authorized to prepare
copies without the copyright owner's permission. Consistent with other
escrow agreement to allow access. However, this system is not only expensive and cumbersome,
it is also impractical for mass distributed software.
Of course, computer programmers, who intimately understand the computer systems they
create, have attempted to foil pirates by using technological barriers. One such barrier is
encryption codes, which limits access to the inner workings of the program to those users who
know the access code. For every sophisticated encryption scheme, however, there are several
relatively cheap and easy methods for breaking the code. A more recent security attempt is the
combination of disk and semiconductor chip encodation in which a unique serial number on
the chip cues into the information contained on the disk. Again, this system can be broken.
In addition, there is a user backlash to such technological schemes since they actually make
software harder to use and nearly preclude safety backup copies. Association of Data Processing
Serv. Org., ADAPSO newsletter, March 28, 1985.
207. See, e.g., S. 339, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (proposes implementation of Rule of the
Shorter Term in computer programs); S. 3074, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (proposes to penalize
owner of copy who rents, leases, or lends the copy for direct or indirect commercial advantage
without the copyright owner's authorization); H.R. 6024, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (addition
of new definitions to Copyright Act and extension of criminal penalties to pirates); H.R. 6983,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (ADAPSO sponsored bill; amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act
that broadens definition of copyrightable works).
In a related area, H.R. 5938, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) proposes a scheme for compulsory
license of record rentals where the noncopyright owners of musical phonorecords would be
allowed to rent, lease, or loan copies, but must pay a royalty from income received to the
copyright owner. See also National Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983, 26 PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 646, at 456-62 (Sept. 15, 1983) (President Reagan's proposed
modification of the antitrust and intellectual property laws).
208. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
209. The proposed statute would also amend current § 101 to include within the definition
of derivative works, "computer program versions specifically tailored for use with a designated
hardware system."
210. Contra 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982); supra note 142.
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sections of copyright law, 21 1 only non-profit, educational institutions are
designated as authorized to make such copies. Furthermore, this section
indicates that even such institutions are precluded from making more than
one identical copy.
The allowances described in the first three subsections of the proposed
statute are narrowly limited in section l(d). This section provides that the
rights afforded in subsections l(a) through l(c) are not to be extended to
situations that involve financial gain, such as when possession of the copy
is acquired through rental, lease, or loan. This section therefore reestablishes
the computer copyright owner's legitimate right to financially benefit from
his labor.
Section 2 of the proposed statute creates a compulsory license scheme for
individuals and organizations who seek to distribute copyrighted computer
programs. A similar scheme is currently in use in the record industry under
section 115. A compulsory license would ensure that the computer program
copyright owner would receive a royalty from the subsequent distribution of
the program. The proposed statute does not suggest a specific royalty figure
for each software program since that figure should be based upon the market
value of the program at the time of the enactment of the statute. The specific
subsections of section 2 parallel similar sections dealing with compulsory
licensing in the making and distribution of phonographic records.21 2
V. CONCLUSION
Although copyright law offers software developers the best means of
protecting mass-marketed computer software, current copyright protection
for software is inadequate. This Comment proposes a reform in the copyright
statute designed to close the loopholes that pirates currently use to legitimize
their conduct. The statute is narrowly drawn to promote the traditional
balance of copyright law between the public's interest in using copyrighted
work and the copyright owner's interest in remuneration. The enactment of
this statute would lead to greater consistency and rationality in cases that
arise from disputes over software owner's rights by precisely defining the
limitations on the software owner's exclusive rights. The software copyright
owner will then have legal protection equivalent to copyright owners whose
intellectual products are memorialized in more traditional media.
William Christopher Graft
211. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
212. 17 U.S.C. § 2(a)-(c) (1982). See also Rosen, A Common Law for the Ages of Intellectual
Property, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 769 (1984) (providing a detailed historical argument for
compelling royalty payments to intellectual property developers).
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APPENDIX: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO COPYRIGHT ACT,
TITLE 17 SOFTWARE PIRACY PROTECTION ACT
PREAMBLE
The Software Piracy Protection Act of 1985 is designed to provide for
increased copyright protection to software developers by precisely defining
and delineating the parameters of the limitations on the software copyright
owner's exclusive rights. This legislation is aimed at placing the software
copyright owner on an equal footing with copyright owners whose works
are memorialized in more traditional media.
§1 Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Computer Programs
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 of this title, it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program lawfully made
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, to make one
identical copy of a particular program, if-
(1) the copy of the program is used exclusively by the copy owner and no
further copies are made from it; and
(2) unless preserved exclusively for archival purposes, the copy is destroyed
either within five years from the date of the making of the initial copy or
in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease
to be rightful; and
(3) the archival copy is to be destroyed either within seven years from the
date of the making of the copy or in the event that continued possession of
the computer program should cease to be rightful.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 of this title, it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program lawfully made
under this title, or a person authorized by such owner, to prepare a derivative
program consistent with the definition of derivative works under section 101
of this title, if-
(1) the derivative program is used exclusively by the copy owner; and
(2) no further derivative programs or copies are made from it.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 of this title, it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program lawfully made
under this title, or a person authorized by such owner, to make one identical
copy or prepare a derivative program, if
(1) such copy or derivative program is to be used exclusively by a nonprofit
educational institution; and
(2) no further copies or derivative programs are made from it.
(d) The privileges prescribed by subsections (a), (b) and (c) do not, unless
authorized by the software copyright owner, extend to any person or orga-
nization who has acquired possession of the copy of a computer program
from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without
acquiring ownership of it.
§2 Scope of Exclusive Rights in Computer Programs: Compulsory License
For Making and Distributing Software
1985] 1029
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
In the case of computer programs, the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner provided by clauses (1), (2) and (3) of section 106 of this title, to
make and distribute copies and derivative programs of such programs, are
subject to compulsory licensing under the conditions specified by this section.
(a) Availability and Scope of Compulsory License-
(]) When computer programs have been distributed to the public in the
United States under the authority of the copyright owner, any other person
or organization may, by complying with the provisions of this section, obtain
a compulsory license to make and distribute copies and derivative programs.
The use of such compulsory license is limited to distribution to the public
for private use.
(b) Notice of Intention to Obtain Compulsory License-
(1) Any person who wishes to obtain a compulsory license under this
section shall, before or within thirty days after making, and before distrib-
uting any computer programs, serve notice of intention to do so on the
copyright owner. If the registration or other public records of the Copyright
Office do not identify the copyright owner and include an address at which
notice can be served, it shall be sufficient to file the notice of intention in
the Copyright Office. The notice shall comply, in form, content and manner
of service, with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe
by regulation.
(2) Failure to serve or file the notice required by clause (1) forecloses the
possibility of a compulsory license and, in the absence of a negotiated license,
renders the making and distribution of copies and derivative programs
actionable as acts of infringement under section 501 of this title and fully
subject to the remedies provided by sections 502 through 506 and 509 of
this title.
(c) Royalty Payable under Compulsory License-
(1) To be entitled to receive royalties under a compulsory license, the
copyright owner must be identified in the registration or other public records
of the Copyright Office. The copyright owner is entitled to royalties for
copies or derivative programs made and distributed after being so identified,
but is not entitled to recover for any copies or derivative programs previously
made and distributed.
(2) Except as provided by clause (1), the royalty under a compulsory
license shall be payable for every copy or derivative program made and
distributed in accordance with the license. For this purpose, a copy or
derivative program is considered "distributed" if the person exercising the
compulsory license has voluntarily and permanently parted with its posses-
sion. Royalties will be on a scale set in 1985 by the Copyright Royalty
Commission, as provided by section 801 of this title, and subject to review
at 5-year interVals thereafter.
(3) Royalty payments shall be made on or before the twentieth day of
each month and shall include all royalties for the month next preceding.
Each monthly payment shall be made under oath and shall comply with
requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation.
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§3 Section 101 of this title is amended as follows:
§101 Definitions
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, computer pro-
gram version specifically tailored for use with a designated computer hard-
ware system, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."

